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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONQUEST OF THE EMPIRE OF JAVA.—

On Monday, the 16th instant, intelligence was received by our Government, that the ships and troops, sent against the Empire of Java, under Rear Adm. Sir Robert Stopford and Sir Samuel Auchmuty, had succeeded in taking the city of Batavia and also the greater part of the Dutch and French European forces in the Empire of Java. The troops landed, it seems, on the 4th of August, Batavia surrendered at discretion on the 8th, and, on the 26th, the intrenched and fortified works of Cornelis were forced. The enemy are stated to have lost two thousand in killed and five thousand in prisoners, including amongst the latter two generals. Our loss is stated to have been considerable. The Governor of the island, whose name was JANSSENS, was a Dutchman, and his troops, about 10,000 in number, were Dutch. The amount of our force, which went from our East India possessions, is not stated in gross; but, from the detail of the several corps engaged, it would seem to have amounted to between 15 and 20 thousand land troops, exclusive of the sailors and marines belonging to the squadron employed on the expedition, which, to have conveyed such an army, must have been considerable, though its force is not particularly stated, an omission so common to all our dispatches of this nature, that it cannot fairly be attributed to accident. The contest seems to have been very sanguinary; for Sir Samuel Auchmuty states, in his dispatch, that "in the action of the 26th, the numbers killed were immense, but it has been impossible to form any accurate statement of the amount. About one thousand have been buried in the works, multitudes were cut down in the retreat, the rivers are choked up with dead, and the huts and woods were filled with the wounded, who have since expired. We have taken near 5,000 prisoners, among whom are 2 General Officers, 34 Field Officers, 70 Captains, and 150 Subaltern Officers;

" General Janssens made his escape with difficulty, during the action, and reached Buitenzorg, a distance of 30 miles, with a few cavalry, the sole remains of an army of 10,000 men. This place he has since evacuated, and fled to the Eastward."—Lord Minto himself, the Governor General of India, repaired to Batavia, the capital of the Empire, and thence he writes his dispatches, dated on the 1st of September. Directly after his arrival there he took formal possession of the sovereignty of the country and of sovereign sway over all its inhabitants, by the following proclamation:—"PROCLAMATION. In the name of his Majesty George the Third, King of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland.—In consequence of the glorious and decisive victory obtained by the British Army under the Command of his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, Commander in Chief, on the 26th of August, by which the French troops were driven out of the strong position at Meester Cornelis, upon which their Generals placed their sole reliance, and by which their whole army, with hardly any exception, either fell in the field, or were made prisoners of war; Lieut. Gen. Janssens fled in great disorder to Buitenzorg; but, knowing that the victorious troops would soon pursue him, he has precipitately quitted that post also, and has directed his flight, in despair, to some other quarter, after having refused a second time the invitation of the English, to enter into arrangements for the benefit of the country, which he left without defence at their disposal.—Lieutenant General Janssens, who represented the French Sovereign in Java, having thus abandoned his charge, and avowed by his actions his incapacity to afford any further protection to the country; the French Government is hereby declared to be dissolved, and the British authority to be fully and finally established in the island of Java, and all the possessions of the French in the Eastern Seas. This Proclamation is issued for the information

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“ of the good people of Java, in order
 “ that they may strictly conform to the
 “ duties of *allegiance and fidelity to their*
 “ *Sovereign George the Third*, and they are
 “ hereby enjoined and commanded, *under*
 “ *the most severe penalties*, to abstain from
 “ holding correspondence with, or afford-
 “ ing any aid or assistance to the Mem-
 “ bers of the late French Government or
 “ its adherents; but on the contrary, sup-
 “ port with zeal and obey with fidelity,
 “ the authority with which they are now
 “ happily united. *A provisional form of*
 “ *Administration* will be immediately es-
 “ tablished, and as soon as that is per-
 “ formed *the beneficent and paternal dispo-*
 “ *sition of the British Government* towards
 “ the people of Java will be manifested
 “ by the publication of such regulations
 “ as may be successively adopted. Done
 “ at Weltevrede, the 29th day of August,
 “ 1811, by his Excellency the Governor
 “ General of British India. (Signed)
 “ MINTO.”—Thus the conquest was
 completed in due form, and assumed all
 the characters of permanent sway over
 the whole nation, without any exception
 as to the rights of any of the native sove-
 reigns of the country; and, in one of his
 dispatches, Lord Minto observes, that this
 conquest being completed, the British na-
 tion has neither an enemy nor a rival left
 from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape
 Horn; that is to say, in nearly one half of
 the globe. His Lordship speaks of this
 achievement as being full of glory and
 advantage, and appears to anticipate from
 it the most beneficial results.—The first
 Lord of the Admiralty, in communicating
 this intelligence to the Lord Mayor of
 London, calls it “ *satisfactory intelligence*;
 the ministerial writers exultingly observe,
 that this puts the finishing hand to the
 work of conquest out of Europe, there
 being now three out of the four quarters of
 the world, wherein neither a French nor
 Dutch flag is flying; and, it is to be re-
 marked, that, on the day when the intelli-
 gence arrived, those old proclaimers of
victory and joy, the Park and Tower guns,
 were fired.—Yet am I, for my part, of
 opinion, that this conquest, great as is its
 magnitude, will be of *no advantage* to this
 country; nay, that it cannot fail to be an
injury to her; for which opinion I will
 now proceed to give my reasons.—Were
 I to confine my view to that description
 of persons in the kingdom, who are the
 dispensers, or the objects, of *patronage*, I
 should be far from saying, that there

was no advantage in this conquest; for, to
 them, it will, for a while, at least, prove a
 most abundant harvest; as it already has
 proved, I dare say, to those immediately
 concerned in it, the worth of the *prices*
 being immense. I look at the conquest
 as it will affect the whole nation; as it will
 affect those who have to pay the taxes,
 and to expose their persons in defence of
 this our own country; and then, I am to
 inquire, how it will aid the pecuniary re-
 sources, or add to the security of the
 country from foreign attack.—But, first
 of all, let us see what this conquest con-
 sists of.—A country, in geographical
 extent equal to England; and, in popula-
 tion, exceeding it by two thirds. The
 Island, or Empire, of Java, contains, it is
 computed, 30 millions of souls. The
 Dutch were the absolute masters of the
 island, though there are in it, one *Em-*
peror, several *Kings*, and many Princes of
 inferior note, who are suffered to retain
 their titles, but are the mere puppets of
 their European Masters, who take upon
 themselves the trouble of governing, espe-
 cially in those two important particulars,
 the *administration of justice* and the *collec-*
tion and disposal of the revenues; that is to
 say, the absolute power over men's *lives*
 and *purses*. We have now stepped into
 the shoes of the Dutch, or, rather, those of
 their sovereign, the Emperor Napoleon;
 and, indeed, the Proclamation of Lord
 Minto, above quoted, clearly shows, that
 we mean to hold the Country by the same
 tenure. That Proclamation takes the ab-
 solute sovereignty from the hands of Na-
 poleon and puts it into those of George the
 Third, who has certainly been the greatest
 conqueror, as well as the greatest warrior
 that ever sat upon the English throne. He
 has lost some territory, indeed, and some
 subjects, in his time; but, what were the
 three millions, which the American States
 contained, at the time of their separation,
 compared to the scores of millions, which
 he has conquered and who are become his
 liege subjects in Asia and Africa?—The
 Empire of Java produces great abundance
 of articles of commerce, especially Spices,
 Indigo, Cotton, Coffee and Sugar; and,
 we are told, in the ministerial prints, that
 we have, by this conquest, supplanted the
 Dutch-French in the most valuable part
 of their commercial possessions and pur-
 suits.—These are fine pictures to draw;
 fine exhibitions to make to a people who
 are called upon so often by the tax-ga-
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war; fine matter for a paragraph or a speech; but, let us not be dazzled by them; let us examine the thing with closer eyes.—In the first place, as to our relationships with Europe and North America: does the reader suppose, that the having made this conquest will tend to convince the nations of Europe, that Napoleon alone has the rage of conquest and ambition in his breast; that it will tend to convince them, that they ought to hate him and make other efforts against him, because he is not content with a sway over the original territories of France; that it will tend to convince them, that we are not actuated by any motives of ambition, and that we are at war purely for our own defence, and for the restoration of the liberties and independence of the nations of Europe; will this conquest, in short, tend to make the nations of Europe regard us solely in the light of *deliverers*? We have here added 30 millions of people to our conquered subjects, a number far surpassing all those whom Napoleon has added to the empire of France; and, if our conquests in India, in Africa and in the Islands of America, since the commencement of the French revolution, be taken into the account, all that he has done in the way of conquest is, as to the number of subjects, a mere trifle; and, as the vulgar saying is, he, as a conqueror, is a fool to us.—And, as to the Dutch nation, what impression must this conquest produce upon their minds? Will they like us the better for it? And will they like him the worse? Will it not rather make them zealous in his cause, and reconcile them to his sway, as the only means of protection against our power? They have often been reproached by our writers for submitting quietly to that sway; but, those writers have never pointed out the means by which the Dutch were in any other way to preserve themselves from submission to us and to Prussia. The States of Holland were compelled to seek protection from the old Government of France, upon whom they actually depended for their safety; and, that which has taken place now is very little, if any, more humiliating than their then situation.—As to the part that Napoleon is acting towards Holland, it is that of a conqueror, to be sure. The country, whose government was then at war against France, was conquered by France in the year 1795, just after the retreat of our army, under the Duke of York, out of

Flanders. From that time, Holland has been at the disposal of France; it has been under the sway of France; and now it has become a part of the French empire, as much as Ireland is become a part of the United Kingdom, sending, in the same manner, deputies, or members, to the Legislative Assembly at Paris.—The right of conquest is a right that has never been disputed until of late. It is the way, and the only way, that the sway over countries is acquired; but, the folly of our complaints against Napoleon, on this score, is, that every word we say, is a word said against ourselves; for, by what other right than that of conquest, do we hold so great a part of India, and by what other right have we divested so many sovereigns of their authority? Talk of putting down sovereigns, indeed! Why, here, in this single conquest, of which we boast, do we not assume absolute sway over an Emperor and several Kings, as well as over the 30 millions of people of whom they formerly claimed allegiance?—How will this new conquest operate in the mind of the American government? Does the reader think, that it will tend to remove any apprehensions there felt, with regard to the power and the views of England? Will it tend to give the President a more favourable opinion of those views? I should think not. I should think, that it would make him doubly fearful of doing any thing tending to throw weight into our scale. He must naturally wish to see neither France nor England have the power to domineer over the world; and, of course, when he sees, that "France" has not a flag flying in any part of three "quarters out of the four," he will feel less apprehensions at her strides than at those of England. Therefore, every conquest that we make tends to give America a stronger and stronger bias towards France. And is it not perfectly ridiculous to hear our writers reproaching the American President for not making our cause his own; for not declaring himself on our side; at the very moment, when these same writers are boasting of our having swept three quarters of the world clean of the French? They say, that England has *staked her existence* upon the event of this contest, and they tell America, that if we fall, she must fall too. They are, here, downright alarmists; but, what must she think of their alarms, when the next packet brings her an account of England having, at one single dash, con-

quered more subjects than Napoleon has conquered all together; and when she hears us not only express no doubts as to the propriety of such conquests, but hears us boast of it as a glorious achievement? —The President, in his late Speech, takes a glance at the revolution now going on in South America, and seems to signify his approbation of the change which is likely to be the result. Strong condemnation has been expressed of that part of his speech here. But, does he not perceive, that that country will, unless independent, fall into the hands of either England or France; and ought he not to wish to see that prevented? This new conquest of ours will not, I presume, tend to alter his opinions upon that subject; for, why should we stop at Java? Why should Peru and Mexico not be as necessary to us as kingdoms in Asia? And why should the President of America think more about the conquest of Spain and Portugal than about that of Java? If he takes a view of the *whole* of the conquests of France, he will find them to fall far short of this *one* conquest of England. Let us see a little how the fact stands, when exhibited in figures. France has conquered, or claimed sovereign sway over the following countries, inhabited by the following numbers of people.

Genoa and Tuscany	1,250,000
Modena and the other Sovereign Dukedoms of Italy	2,000,200
States of the Pope	2,000,000
The Two Sicilies	6,005,396
The United Provinces	2,758,632
Switzerland	1,900,000
Hanover, Brunswick, Ham- burgh, &c.	1,145,000
Spain	11,000,000
Portugal	1,838,879

29,898,107

England has conquered and proclaimed full and sovereign authority over the Empire of Java, containing of inhabitants

30,000,000

Deduct conquered by France 29,898,107

Balance in favour of Eng-
land 101,893

Now, observe, reader, this is giving the Island of *Sicily* to France, while it is very well known, that our writers recommend the vigorous measure of taking possession

of it for ourselves, and it is also giving her Spain and Portugal, of the latter of which countries it is equally well known that we have actual possession and almost absolute command, and of the former of which we say that the French will never obtain the sovereignty. I have here placed the object in the best possible point of view for the enemy; and yet, we beat him by 101,893 conquered souls. I beg, therefore, to ask any man in his senses, what should induce the President of America to be alarmed at the progress of French ambition, and to feel no alarm at all at the progress of English ambition? —I shall be told, perhaps, that there is a great deal of *difference* in the two cases. O, aye! a great deal indeed. I am well aware of that: namely, that the one is *French* and the other is *English*; but that is all the difference that I can see. There is indeed another difference to us; that is, that our conquests are in another hemisphere, whereas those of Napoleon are close at home; are of territories and people bordering upon France, and speaking, in great part, the French language. But, while this, though an important distinction with us, will not, I should suppose, weigh much with the American President, who can scarcely be more alarmed at that power which confines its conquests to Europe and to its own borders than at those of a power, which sends its conquering fleets and armies to the utmost extent of the globe. Am I told, that Napoleon would gladly extend his conquests to distant countries if he could; my answer is, that his inability to do it must render him less an object of fear with America. So that, in whatever way I view the matter, I cannot help thinking, that, as far as this new conquest of ours have any effect at all upon the minds of the American government and people, the effect will be that of giving them a stronger disinclination than before existed of throwing any part of their weight into our scale in the present contest, which, in spite of all our boasting, we yet feel to be *for our existence as a nation independent of France*. —And here we come to the second question: what advantage will *this* country, what advantage will the *people of England, Scotland and Ireland*, derive from this conquest? That it will benefit those who possess *patronage* and those who crave for its largesses I know very well; that it opens a vast field for those who wish to get fortunes without labour or study; that



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it will be an out-let for hundreds and thousands of persons who for divers reasons require a voyage to the antipodes; that it will disburden many and many an individual who is loaded with that species of poor-rates which the parish knows nothing of; that it will tend to make elbow-room upon the sinecure and pension lists: that it will do all this I readily allow; for Java with its 30,000,000 of people and all its Emperors and kings cannot be taken proper care of without a great number of persons from this country any more than they were by their Dutch or French rulers. We are told that these latter "took care of the administration of Justice, and of the public revenue;" and, it is not to be doubted, that we shall take as good care, at least, of these matters as they did. Here will be an abundance of lawyers and of tax-gatherers wanted, and, will any man say, that we are, as to numbers, at least, deficient in either; and, with regard to the latter, can any man have the face to say, that he supposes, that we fall short, in point of experience and ability, of any nation to be found on the globe, whether we speak of taxes to be raised on land or on water?—To impart to "the good people of Java," as Lord Minto calls them, a portion of what we enjoy in the above-named descriptions of persons the nation might, and, doubtless, would, be very willing; but, still I ask, what advantage the conquest will produce to the people of this kingdom; to the people who perform the labour and pay the taxes of the country?—Will it cause less labour; or, which is more to the point, will it cause less taxes to be paid by the present payers of taxes; for all centers there at last? That it will not I am, for my part, fully convinced; and, indeed, I am pretty confident, that I shall be able to show to my readers, when the proper time comes, that it will have caused an augmentation of the taxes. I never yet saw one of our conquests which did not produce such an effect, in which respect our conquests are of a nature precisely the opposite of that of the conquests of our enemy, who always makes a shift *tirer parti*, as he calls it, or, as we call it, *to turn to good account*, the conquests that he makes. In short, he always makes the people, whom he conquers, assist in carrying on the war against us, while we, as far as my observation has gone, always incur a new burthen with every new conquest. I shall be told, that this conquest clears the Eastern seas of

every French sail, and that we shall require less men of war, and, of course, less expence to protect our commerce in those seas. May be so; but, that is not to my point; which is simply this: will the conquest diminish our taxes? If it does not, it is worth nothing to us.—Yes, it might possibly be, if it rendered us at home more secure against those deadly blows which the enemy aims at us; and here we come to the last and the main point of our discussion; for, though the conquest were not to lessen our taxes; nay, if it were to augment them if that can well be; still if it lessened our danger, if it added to our security, I should freely say, it was a good thing; a thing for which we ought to toss our hats into the air, to hollow, and to make bonfires, the age for which latter seems, by-the-bye, to be passed. I do not, however, see how this can possibly be. For, in the first place, Java will require European troops; and have we these to spare? All the good things in Java, with 30 millions of people; all the justice, all the Revenue, will require troops. But, granted that we can find troops to send thither, still there is nothing added to that force which is to protect us against the fleets that are building for the avowed purpose of our subjugation, and to augment which force so many schemes have been resorted to. The reader cannot carry in his mind one half of the devices that have been put in practice to get men into the army. Measure after measure have been adopted, law after law; there have been regulars and militia, and fencibles and supplementary militia and army of reserve and local militia and volunteers and volunteering out of the militia into the regulars. In short, what has not been resorted to in order to augment and keep up the military force in this kingdom? Now, it will, I suppose, be admitted, that these measures have all been necessary to the safety of the country; I mean to the defence of the country against the French; for, as to any other danger; as to any other purpose for keeping up this force, it never has, at any rate, been openly avowed. Well, then, if all these means of raising men, means so distressing to the people, so burdensome to the parishes and so ruinous to many individuals, have been necessary to the defence of the country against the French, who are just on the other side of the Channel, must not that defence be rendered less secure, must not our danger be augmented,

by sending 15 or 20 thousand troops, and keeping them up, in the newly conquered Empire? Shall I be told, that the troops necessary for the defence of the empire of Java will go from our Indian Empire? My answer is, that they cannot be spared thence; or that, if they can, we have been making great waste of money and of lives in keeping up so large a force in our Indian Empire, and that, too, at a time, when the superfluous force might have been employed in Spain and Portugal, or at Walcheren. No: it is clear, that we must send out an additional number of troops to those Empires; and then, I say, that we shall, by so much as this number amounts to, weaken our defence at home. If, indeed, we could hire foreign troops, at so much per head, as was done in the American war, there would then be nothing but the money wanting; but these, I believe, are not, now-a-days, to be got to serve *out of Europe*. So that we must, it seems to me, make an absolute deduction from our native force, for the purpose of securing the possession of this newly conquered Empire. Thus do our conquests work in a way precisely opposite to that of the conquest of Napoleon, who from all the countries that he conquers, draws legions to fight against us, and whose armies now in the peninsula, are well known to consist in great part of Germans, Italians, Hollanders, Swiss, and even Polanders. If we, indeed, could bring a hundred or two of thousands of our newly conquered subjects into the field against the French; if we could bring a good stout army of those brave people, 30,000,000 of whom suffer themselves to be held in subjection by 15 or 20 millions; if we could bring these into the field against the French, we might see fine works; but, as matters are, the conquering of them will give us not the smallest security against France, and must, as I think, I have shewn, weaken the defence we already have.—At the time when the peace of Amiens was made, the ministers and Mr. PITT (for whom, in fact, the peace was made by Mr. Addington), told the nation, in their Speeches in parliament, that *extension of dominion was no proof of an increase of real power*. Their motive for doing this was plain enough. They, who had all been in office during the Anti-Jacobin war, had to justify themselves for having suffered France to retain such an extension of territory as she did retain at the peace. They, therefore, to

hide their disgrace, held forth that France would rather be weakened than strengthened by her new acquisitions. They were told of *Antwerp* and of the fleets that would grow up there; but, still they insisted that an extension of territory would tend to weaken the power of France; and, Lord Hawkesbury, who had once talked of marching to Paris, said, that all the territorial conquests of France were more than over-balanced by our acquisitions in the way of "*capital, credit, and confidence*;" whereupon Lord Castlereagh produced a string of statements and calculations about imports and exports, proving the truth of Lord Hawkesbury's assertion. These worthy people forgot, or seemed to have forgotten, wholly, that they had, a thousand times over, insisted upon the necessity of continuing the war in order to drive the French within their old boundaries: and that one of the great alledged grounds of the war, in the first instance, was the necessity of preventing the French from opening the navigation of the Scheldt. All this they had forgotten, or supposed that the people had forgotten it; but, at any rate, they now all said, that there was no danger to England from the extension of the dominion of France; for, that extension of dominion was no proof of an increase of power.—Now, passing over the inconsistency, the change of tone, of these people, and passing over also the fact, that we are every day of our lives inveighing against Napoleon for extending his dominions, and that we are now, as we say, "*fighting the battles of England*" in endeavouring to keep him from conquering Spain and Portugal; passing all this over, let us see how this position of Lord Hawkesbury applies to our present case. As a *general* position it certainly is not true; for, if it were, what state need ever be afraid of the aggrandisement of its neighbour; what state would ever complain of its neighbour's conquests? If it were true as a general position, little states would be more powerful than great ones, which it would be burlesque to attempt to maintain. Conquests, extension of territory, by adding the means of warfare, generally add power to that which a country already possesses, as was shown in the rise of Prussia, where a kingdom, and one of the most powerful in Europe, grew out of additions of territory and of subjects from time to time made to a petty Electorate. But, then the conquered parts, the acquired territory, must be contiguous;

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nature must assist policy. The territory must be advantageously placed, and the people must be able and willing to defend their new government; they must bring no burthen upon the conqueror, but must bring him assistance. Where this is the case, extension of territory is a proof, and the most certain of all proofs, of an increase of power. This is the case with the conquests of Napoleon. The countries of which he has assumed the sovereignty lie contiguous to France; they are parted from her only by imaginary bounds, such as those which separate Middlesex from Hertfordshire; the people inhabiting those countries had an intimate intercourse with France before. When you get to Ham-
burgh or Rome, indeed, the connection was more remote, but, still there was a connection by the means of intermediate countries, and when these had been annexed to France, the annexation of the former partook less of the odious nature of a conquest. But, how is it with our conquests? What connexion is there between us and the people conquered? They knew us not as neighbours but merely as conquerors; and, of course, we have no power over them other than that of the sword; no principle to govern by but that of fear. From such conquests no military aid is to be expected; but, on the contrary, they demand a part of our own military means to secure us the possession of them. Nothing is to be drawn from them in the way of taxes; for all the proceeds of those are swallowed up by the persons deputed to rule over the conquered; and, if we wanted any proof of this fact, it is found in the experience of all our colonies, not one of which ever yet sent a shilling into the Exchequer. Far different, therefore, are those conquests which the conqueror annexes to his own dominions from those which he holds at a distance. And this is the difference between the conquests of France and those of England. The former gives strength to the conqueror and the latter weakness. The former are like fresh battalions brought up to join the main army; the latter like towns captured in a country where the battle is not to be fought. If there were two armies engaged in a desperate conflict upon Salisbury Plain, one fighting for Wiltshire and the other for Dorsetshire, what should we say to the General who should, in the midst of the battle, on the result of which his existence and that of his county depended, send off a detachment of his army to take

possession of the highlands of Scotland? What should we say to such a general? And yet, this does seem to me to be not very dissimilar to our conduct in pursuing distant conquests, while, according to our own acknowledgments, we are carrying on in Europe a contest, upon which we have staked our existence.—Some persons think, that these distant conquests will, at any rate, be worth something to us, as objects of exchange in the negotiating of a peace. Did colonies tell in this way at the last peace? Did they purchase back one single yard square of European territory? Did they take one jot of power out of the hands of France? No man will say that they did; and why should they do it at another peace? If, indeed, the taking of the Empire of Java would afford us even a chance of diminishing the power of Napoleon at a peace; if it would make him, for one week, cease his ship-building at Antwerp, I should say there was some national advantage in it; but, it will not do that; and will, on the contrary, sharpen his desire totally to destroy the power of England. During the Anti-Jacobin war, when that profound pair of statesmen, Pitt and Dundas, were conquering Sugar and Coffee Islands, the orators in the French tribune promised their country, that they would reconquer those Islands on the continent of Europe. "Let the English capture and guard and cultivate and improve our colonies," said they, "we have something else to attend to; and, at the peace we will make them deliver them up with all their improvements." And were they not as good as their word?—The conquest, of which we are speaking, cannot, however fail to give an additional degree of desire to Napoleon to destroy the power of England. He sees, as well as we, that there is not a French flag flying in any quarter of the world except Europe; and he cannot see this without feeling a strong desire to put an end to the cause, and to force into action all his resources for that purpose. We do not go about to nip the ramifications of spreading weeds; we do not even give ourselves the trouble to trace to their points the numerous shoots; we look for nothing but the root, and having found that and cut it off, we leave the rest of the work to the ordinary operations of nature and time. The root of all these colonial conquests is here in England. Our enemy will never attempt to reconquer colonies from us; he will leave the ramifications to

themselves; but, as he sees them increase, he will see the necessity increase of getting at the root. In this view of the matter, therefore, I am inclined to think, that, if the conquest of the Empire of Java answers no other purpose, it will not be likely to fail in answering that of rendering the great conflict here more desperate, more expensive, more bloody, and of longer duration. I do not know that it is possible for Napoleon to make our commercial exclusion from the continent of Europe more complete than it is; but if it be possible, I am sure that this new conquest will be a reason for attempting it: and, indeed, it is folly not to believe, that no exertion will be spared to effect against us all possible mischief, in which Napoleon's measures will, doubtless, be cordially approved of by the Dutch.—Such is my view of the nature and probable consequences of the conquest of the Empire of Java. I am aware that I differ from many persons respecting it, and especially from the editor of the Morning Chronicle, who observes, that our success here points out the sort of warfare that we ought to pursue; but, if he were asked, whether he believes, that the possession of the Empire of Java is equal in real value to the possession of any one of the forts at the mouth of the Scheldt, or into that of a single farm in Switzerland or in the late Austrian Flanders, I hardly think that he would venture to answer in the affirmative.

SPAIN. THE WAR.—French dispatches give us an account of the operations of their armies in Spain, from the fall of Saguntum (mentioned in a former Number) to the 18th of November. Marshal Count Suchet writes, under date of the 6th of November, that he was beginning to prepare for the siege of the city of Valencia: that he had defeated some bands of Spaniards after the fall of Saguntum, and that he was clearing the country of these bands. He speaks very confidently of the success of the siege; and mentions that the English Consul, Tupper, is circulating money in profusion, and the most false and ridiculous news with a view of keeping up the spirits of the Valencians. The Consul has, we see, from our newspapers, published an address to the soldiers in the French army, inviting them to *desert*, and promising them protection and reward.—The Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, under dates of the 21st and 26th of October and 2nd of November, gives an account of the

death of General Gaudinot, who killed himself with a musket, and who, as the Duke says, was afflicted with melancholy. Our writers attribute this act to chagrin at not having been able to beat the Spanish General Ballasteros; but there does not appear much ground for this. The Duke is quite severe on General Girard, who was surprised by General Hill; and he threatens the former with punishment, accusing him of almost wilful neglect. He states the French made prisoners upon that occasion at 400; we stated them at 1,000; probably the truth lies between the two accounts. — COUNT DORSENNE gives, under dates of 21st October and 9th November, accounts of several engagements of inferior note, in all of which, as he says, the French were victorious, killing many hundreds and making more prisoners.—From these accounts, making due allowance for exaggeration and suppression, I think that, as to Valencia, which is a very important object, it is likely not to make a very long resistance; for, in the first place, it has Suchet before it, and it has the *dreadful example of Tarragona*. Mr. Tupper's invitation to the foreigners in the French army will be of little avail, as long as these foreigners have a fair prospect of plunder before them, and have provisions in their camp: nobody ever knew such men desert under such circumstances. Suchet appears to be a man of great ability and of equal courage: a man of great *resource*, as the French call it. A French officer, on parole at Alresford, has written to me to assure me, that Suchet was never a *barber*, but was the son of a *Manufacturer* of eminence in his line of life, and received a good education. This was of no consequence at all. It will neither add to nor diminish any part of his merit or demerit. He will not be known in history, nor in the present times, by his former state of life, no, nor by his rank, but by his *acts* in Spain or in any other part where he may be employed; nor will the circumstance be of any consequence to them against whom he may serve. The inhabitants of Tarragona might as well have been killed by a barber as by a manufacturer. They did wrong to suffer so long a resistance to be made, and I do not know that it was in his power to prevent the bloody consequences. All that we know of him for *certain* is, that he has shown great talents as a general, and this we know only from his great success; for amidst all the lies (for where there are

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such flat contradictions there must be lies) we hear, it is impossible to build upon any thing except such great and notorious acts as cannot be denied. I have observed that, since I have been in Newgate, this commander has sent about 25 thousand men prisoners to France, including about 12 hundred officers. This is a fact that has been found to be undeniable, and this fact is enough for his reputation as a general.

—Upon a view of the whole of this intelligence, it is fairly to be presumed, that the French experience great harrassing from the Spaniards, especially those who fight in small irregular bodies, who appear to be a species of bands, and of whom the inhabitants are, probably, as much afraid as they are of the French, if not more. Their mode of warfare is something like that which was practised by the Royalists in La Vendée; and if they could take safe possession of any one particular district, they might probably obtain for themselves some considerable boon at the hands of the French; but, there does not seem any good reason to suppose, that they will be able to retard, for any length of time, worth speaking of, the subjugation of their country, unless assisted by a greater force than it appears we are able to send into the peninsula.——It is much to the honour of the Spaniards (supposing them to be actuated by a hatred of being conquered, and not by a senseless prejudice or a still more senseless fanaticism) that they have withstood the French, in any portion of the country, so long as they have. It is often observed in our public prints, that they are a very different enemy from the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Dutch, to which may be added the Hanoverians and the Brunswickers; but, without stopping to make any remark upon these omissions, let me ask these writers, these wise men, whether they are aware of the tendency of this contrast? The Spaniards were deserted by their King and all the royal family; and, when they first rose with arms in their hands, they rose to oppose him to whom both their kings had consigned their authority; they rose, as they expressly stated, against their "*old infamous government.*" Now, the nations, who have been subdued by France, had all of them their Kings and old governments at their head. To reason from analogy here would, therefore, lead to conclusions, which, I imagine, these writers would be very much afraid to draw. They should, then, be very careful to abstain from so frequently dun-

ning the premises in the ears of their readers. But, this is their way, they are bunglers, and if they were not bunglers, they would not be venal writers.

CITY ADDRESS.—The general principles of American policy, as relative to France and England, were discussed in my last. I will not now hazard, because it would be useless, any conjectures as to what measure the Congress will adopt with regard to England; nor would I again revive the question relative to the *Orders in Council*, that having been already discussed more fully than was necessary to the conviction of impartial men; but, an article in the *Courier*, of the 19th instant, upon the *City Address** (which I in-

* On Wednesday, 18th December, 1811, the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, the Aldermen, Sheriffs, and Common Council of the City of London, waited upon his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, at York-house, with the following Address, which was read by the Recorder:—

To his Royal Highness the PRINCE OF WALES, Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,

The dutiful and loyal Address of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled.

May it please your Royal Highness, We, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, humbly approach your Royal Highness on behalf of ourselves, and the community at large, with an earnest request that your Royal Highness will be graciously pleased to adopt such measures, as with the advice of the Most Honourable the Privy Council shall seem meet, for causing a suspension of the use of Grain in the Distilleries of the United Kingdom, such suspension appearing to us to be one of the most effectual means of preventing those serious evils which a farther rise in the price of grain is at this time so obviously calculated to produce; and we farther humbly beg leave to express our confident hope, that, well aware, as your Royal Highness must be, of the causes of the present scanty supply of grain from foreign parts, and of the great distress that may arise therefrom, your Royal Highness, to whose justice and humanity we shall not, we trust, appeal in vain, will be graciously pleased to em-

sert below), demands some attention. The reader will perceive, that the City is here found fault with for having presented such an Address. That alone would deserve some notice; but, here is a defence, or, at least, an attempt at a defence, of the conduct of the Ministers in refusing to revoke the Orders in Council, and this must not pass unnoticed. — “Undoubtedly his Royal Highness is aware of the causes of scanty supplies from foreign parts; he is aware that his *Ministers have no controul* over them; that the measures they have adopted were measures *strictly of defence*, the necessity for which was *imposed upon them by the offensive decrees of the enemy*, in which decrees, America, the only neutral nation, either tacitly acquiesced or feebly and slowly opposed. The City desire, though they do not say so directly, that the Orders in Council should be repealed, and the usual channels of foreign intercourse reopened. No persons would be more willing to do so than the Ministers: but there must be two parties to the contract, and the City of London have not informed us how we are to compel one of them to execute it.

ploy all the means in your power, by adopting measures corresponding with your own Royal character and disposition, to re-open to us, if it be practicable, those channels of intercourse with foreign, and especially neutral nations, which have heretofore been found so generally advantageous to his Majesty's subjects, and so good a security against those dreadful calamities which are but too often the consequence of a scarcity of the necessities of life.

To which Address his Royal Highness was pleased to return the following most gracious Answer:

I must always see with great concern the pressure arising from a deficiency in the harvest. I have directed such steps to be taken as may tend to give the earliest effect to any measures which may be adopted by Parliament, for the purpose of relieving the inconveniences or evils likely to result from such deficiency; and whenever circumstances shall make it practicable, nothing shall be wanting on my part to contribute towards the restoration of commercial intercourse between this country and other nations to the footing on which it has been usually conducted even in the midst of war.

“They do not assert (and we are glad that they have not repeated the language of the Americans and their advocates in this country) that Buonaparté has really repealed one of his Decrees against us, or that *the Berlin and Milan Edicts are not in as much force as they were when they were first issued*. To repeal our Orders in Council, therefore, would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations; and of this his Royal Highness seems perfectly convinced. He assures the City of London, “that nothing shall be wanting on his part to contribute towards the restoration of commercial intercourse, whenever circumstances shall make it practicable,” or, in other words, *whenever Buonaparté, by really repealing his Decrees, shall prove to us, that he is himself desirous of such restoration*. But he must set the example of relaxation, because he set the example of severity. The initiative must proceed from him, and those who argue otherwise, attempting to persuade the people that our Orders in Council are the causes of commercial distress, and that their repeal would remove it, *practise a scandalous delusion upon the Country*.” — No: it is you, and your like, who practise a scandalous delusion upon the country, in making attempts to cause them to believe the contrary; and to prove this be it now my task. — It is said here, that the Ministers have *no controul over the causes which do, or may, prevent the supply of corn from foreign parts*; and further, that, if the Orders in Council were repealed, *that measure would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations*. — With regard to the first of these assertions, it may possibly be true, because we do not yet know, that the Americans have prevented, or will prevent, corn to be shipped for England. But, as to the second assertion, it is as destitute of truth as any thing that ever appeared even in this same Courier; for, what is it that prevents the free intercourse with America now? What is it that has caused the prohibition of the entrance of English goods into the American States? Does not every one know that it is the existence of our Orders in Council? Is not the fact notorious? Is it not well known, that the President, by a Proclamation issued in November 1810, declared, that, if those Orders were not repealed by the 2nd day of February, 1811, the importa-

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tion of English goods should cease; and, is it not notorious, that such importation did cease accordingly? And does not the President now declare, that this is the cause of the non-importation?—What assurance, then, must a man have to say, in a public print, that, if the Orders were repealed it would not bring us a bit nearer the desired re-establishment of commercial intercourse with foreign nations; unless, indeed, grown bold by the conquest of the Empire of Java, he does not regard America as a *foreign* nation, but as still being an appendage to the Mother Country?—Here is America, at any rate; here is this great out-let for our goods; here is an out-let that took off one third part of the whole of our exports; here is this market cut off by the Orders in Council, and solely by them; and, as it would be in the power of the Ministers to repeal those Orders, to them the nation has to look for responsibility on the subject.—But, I shall be told, perhaps, that the Orders *ought not to be repealed*. That may be; but that is *another question*; and that question we will now discuss.—I will first say, for myself, that of these Orders in Council I always disapproved; not, however, on account of the power that they caused to be exercised; but, on account of that power being exercised under pretext of retaliation against Napoleon, instead of meeting the hostility of the world in the shape of a *right* boldly declared to exercise a mastership on the sea; and I foresaw, and foretold, that, if ever Napoleon repealed his decrees, our ministers would find themselves compelled to break with America at a time less advantageous than at the time when the Orders were first issued. I was further of opinion, that such a power as the Orders gave would so distress the continent of Europe as to compel Napoleon to repeal his decrees and to suffer commerce to take its usual channel. In this I was deceived. Experience has proved, that the continent is too safely in his hands, and that the privation of colonial and English goods can be borne with. But, experience, which makes fools wise, has, of course, had no effect upon men like our ministers.—The ministers went, not upon our *right, generally*, to exercise such a power upon the sea; but, upon the particular right of *retaliation*. They said to America: France has issued certain decrees detrimental to *your* commerce with us; and, therefore, we have issued Orders detrimental to *your* commerce with her.

The logic by which this was attempted to be justified was perfectly original, as was the act itself. The pretext did, however, clearly imply, that, the Orders were to remain in force no longer than the Decrees. Indeed they could not, if they were to be considered as measures of *retaliation*. Whenever America complained of these Orders, which, in effect, cause war to be carried on against the American ships trading with France, as far as merchant ships can taste of war; whenever she complained of these Orders, we told her, that they should be revoked as soon as she could prevail upon Napoleon to repeal his decrees. She was told, that we were very anxious for that event; and that, in order to get rid of all difficulties as to which party should begin to repeal first, we were to proceed *step by step* with France in the good work. Well, France did, at last, not only begin, but ended this work. Napoleon revoked his decrees, and then America called upon our ministers to do the same, agreeably to their repeated professions and promises. They did not repeal their Orders; and the consequence was, the execution of the non-importation act in America, which has assisted so materially to produce the present distress in the manufacturing towns in England. What, then, is the ground of justification, which this partizan of the ministers takes. Why, he says, that Napoleon *has not revoked his Decrees*, and that, therefore, our ministers are right in not repealing the Orders in Council. Thus the question is reduced to a mere point of fact; and where are we to look for satisfactory evidence of this fact, except in the declarations of the American ministers and government? The evidence that we have is as follows: Mr. Pinkney, then American minister in London, officially informed our government in August 1810, that he had received official information from the American minister at Paris, that the French decrees were revoked, and that the revocation was to be acted upon on the 2nd of November, 1810. Mr. Madison, upon receiving the same information, issued a Proclamation declaring the fact, and, at the same time declaring, as the law required him, that, if England did not revoke her Orders before the 2nd of February 1811, the non-importation Act would be put in execution as to English goods. Here, then, the fact was asserted first by an accredited minister in England; next in a proclamation by the President in America; next by an Act of

Congress, put in force after the operation of the revocation; and now in the speech of the President, after a year's observation and experience; for, he says, in this Speech: "it was hoped, that the *successive confirmations of the extinction of the French decrees*, so far as they violated "our neutral commerce, would have induced Great Britain to repeal its Orders in Council." And, after all this, the fact is denied, and that denial is made the ground of a refusal to repeal the Orders in Council! Yes, we are still coolly told, that it is for Buonaparté to *begin* repealing; and that *then* we will follow his example!—This really is too impudent. We know better than the President and the Congress whether their commerce be still subjected to the French decrees! We are the only judges of the fact whether they be still injured in this respect by the French? They are to see with *our* eyes and hear with *our* ears! This is acting the *Mother* country to some tune.—We will believe nothing and nobody. We ourselves are the sole judges of what is true and what false in the whole world. We not only claim the right of judging for ourselves, but that of judging for America also. She is to believe or disbelieve as we dictate: and, though a fact comes vouched by a declaration of the President and by a law of the Congress, we, without the smallest ceremony, treat it as a *notorious falsehood*. This is what our venal prints, and the one above-quoted, has done; and, indeed, this is what our government does, if it refuses to admit that the French decrees, as far as they related to America, are really revoked.—Does the reader think, that this is calculated to conciliate America? Does he think, that this is the way to re-open the channels of commercial intercourse with neutral nations? Does he think that the Americans will brook such an affront, than which it is impossible to offer a greater? it is telling the whole world, that the Chief Magistrate and the Legislature of the United States are both *liars* and *hypocrites*, and the basest of hypocrites, too; because the object of the lie must be to disguise facts, which, if acknowledged, would call upon them for measures of resistance.—What would our government say, if their solemn declarations were thus treated by America? Nay, what would they say to *one of us*, if we were so to treat their declarations? One of the charges in the Ex Officio Information which sent

Mr. Gilbert Wakefield to Dorchester Jail for two years, was, that he accused "the "great Statesman now no more" of *insincerity* in his overtures to treat for peace with the French Republic. And, are we to suppose, that other governments are to be accused of lies and hypocrisy without moving their gall? Is no government but our own to be supposed to have any feeling?—At this rate, there can never be any peace between us and America; for, it is perfect nonsense to treat with a government, upon whose declarations you place no reliance. There can be no accommodation while this pretension to be the sole judge of the veracity of the American government is asserted. It has, indeed, been distinctly asserted only in our venal news-papers, as yet; but it must be distinctly abandoned, in acts, at least, before any accommodation can possibly take place.—So much for the revocation of the French Decrees; but this writer is quite wide of the mark. He seems to suppose that the only ground, upon which our ministers refuse to repeal the Orders in Council. This, however, is not the case; for, it appears from the President's Speech, that, if our ministers were to acknowledge the revocation of the French Decrees, they are by no means prepared to repeal the orders. They have taken entirely *new ground*, and say, that they will not repeal till *our goods* are permitted to be carried by neutrals, *into the ports now shut against them*. The President says, that it was, with the English government, "an indispensable condition of the repeal of the Orders in Council, that commerce should be restored to a footing, that would admit the "productions and manufactures of Great Britain, when owned by neutrals, into "markets shut against them by the "enemy." That is to say, that, though France does repeal her Decrees, we will not repeal our Orders, unless Napoleon permits neutral ships to carry our goods into the countries out of which he now shuts them; though France does cease to prohibit America from trading with England, the latter will not permit America to trade with France, unless Buonaparté will receive English goods, though the means of neutrals. So that we here punish America because France has established such internal regulations are as injurious to our produce and manufactures, though, as to those regulations, America has neither the power nor the right to interfere.—And, does

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the reader believe, that we shall get our end? Does he believe, that America will be able, or, indeed, that she will endeavour, to prevail upon Napoleon to abandon the Continental System? Yet this is manifestly what the answer of the Prince Regent alludes to, when he talks of a change of circumstances. He says, that he shall be ready to contribute "towards the restoration of commercial intercourse between this country and other nations to a footing on which it has been usually conducted even in the midst of war." Yes, but where is the power, or where the right, to make the French abandon their custom house regulations? What should we say, if any nation were to demand of us to give up any part of our prohibitions or seizures or confiscations? What should we say to any nation who should dare to interfere with us in the execution of our smuggling laws? What should we say to an American envoy who should make to us any proposition having that object in view? "The footing on which it has usually been conducted." Aye, but there is no principle in the law of nations that forbids the exclusion of English produce and manufactures from other countries. Every sovereign has a right to admit, or not admit, whatever goods he pleases into his states, unless he be under some particular engagement with regard to such admission or non-admission. We punish America because she does not force France to suffer English goods to enter the continent of Europe; but, what should we say of Napoleon, if he were to punish America for not forcing England to admit French goods into this kingdom?—But, the thing is too plain to admit of further illustration. It is a mere question of power; we are able to seize American vessels trading with the French Empire, and we seize them. If any one thinks that this is good policy, let him say so; but, let no one attempt to justify the measure by the miserable means that the above writer has resorted to. Time will shew what the effect of the measure will be; but, I am of opinion, that there are few men of any information to be found, who expect it to produce a restoration of trade to the continent of Europe or that of North America.

CARACCAS.—The adherents of the old government in this country appear to be making desperate efforts to prevent the establishment of freedom. My readers

have before seen the new constitution formed in the Caraccas, and, I trust, they have seen it with great satisfaction. It was not, however, to be expected, that such a change would be accomplished without troubles and bloodshed. There always are so many persons so deeply interested in preventing the putting down of an old system of sway, and especially such an one as existed in the Caraccas; there are so many persons, who, when stripped of what they got from the public resources, may as well cease to exist at once, that it is never to be expected, that they will yield without a desperate struggle; and, as they will seldom fail to have a considerable number of dependents and partizans, who, more or less, partake in their fall, the struggle will seldom fail to produce some bloodshed.—It was stated, sometime ago, that Miranda, the Commander in Chief, had taken possession of New Valencia, and it now appears, that there has been a formidable conspiracy, the object of which was to wrest it out of the hands of the Republicans. The governor of the place, under the date of Sept. 6th, writes thus to General Miranda.—
 "It gives me extreme pain to inform you, that last night a conspiracy broke out in this city, the object of which was to overturn the Authorities lately established, and again to place Valencia in the hands of the enemies of the cause of independence.—The number of infatuated persons engaged in this detestable plot has not been ascertained; but at present more than 200 are in confinement, many of them persons of the highest trust and distinction. It should seem, that by means of bribery many of the troops that had sworn allegiance to the General Congress, notwithstanding the benefits they had derived under its Government, were induced to disregard their oath, and abandon their duty, and even the guards of the palace were parties to the conspiracy. The 13th, 22d, and 23d regiments of infantry, and the 27th of cavalry, however, remained faithful to their officers.—At midnight the palace was attacked, when these gallant troops flew to their arms, and with unexampled intrepidity put to death a few conspirators who had scaled the walls, and with fixed bayonets effectually resisted the entrance of several thousands who had forced the gates. This dreadful contest continued for the space of an hour, when the triumph of

“the cause of liberty was again conspicuous. The enemies of the confederated provinces were every where defeated, and the approach of day-light displayed to view the leaders of about 700 victims. —Such are the particulars I now have it in my power to detail; and since the defeat of this horrible project, I have taken the necessary measures to secure and bring to trial the prisoners, but not until some of the conspirators, taking advantage of the confusion, effected their escape through the gates of the city. I am happy to add that all is now tranquil, and the prisoners in my hands will be brought to trial, and executed, as soon as is consistent with the course of the law.” —Another article of intelligence is of still more importance. It appears, that, on the 21st of September, a person of the name of PAZ had been appointed on a mission from the Government of Venezuela to that of the *United States*; and that he was to inform the latter that his Confederation is ready and willing to *enter into a commercial treaty with the North American Government*. — This, though naturally to be expected, is intelligence of a high order. That such a treaty will be formed there is little room to doubt. Indeed, the Speech of the American President prepared us for this, and more. “In contemplating the scenes,” says he, “which distinguish this momentous epoch, and estimating their claims to our attention, it is impossible to overlook those developing themselves among the great communities, which occupy the Southern portion of our own hemisphere, and extend into our neighbourhood. An enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing on the National Councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their destinies; to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will; to regard the progress of events; and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established.” — Let any one look at the map of America, and he will be at once convinced, that there must exist a close connection between the United States and the new Republics which are rising up in the South. The latter have the Gold and Silver and numerous other commodities wanted in the United States, while these latter have all the things wanted by their Southern neighbours, ships and arms and ammunition not excepted. It may be too much

to hope; but it is by no means impossible, that two or three years may see freedom established in all those countries, whither the Spaniards carried slavery, persecution, and the most horrible cruelties. — Now, now is the time for the achievement. The old government of Spain can give its representatives no assistance; it has neither ships nor troops. England can spare none of the latter. Every man that she can spare out of these islands is called for in Portugal, Spain and Sicily. She cannot send troops against the Republicans of South America; and, as to Napoleon, his ships, if he had the troops to spare, dare not venture out to sea. Thus is all Europe benumbed with regard to South America and its revolutions. The great powers here, who could alone interfere with effect, are safely bound to Europe by their mutual animosities. This is lucky, at least, for South America, which will now become an object of extraordinary interest with those, who wish to see freedom and happiness the lot of all men, inhabit whatever country they may. — A free commerce with South America, or even with the Caraccas alone, will produce wonderful effects in the United States. It is precisely that sort of commerce which is most advantageous to them: it opens a market for their produce, and what they have never before had, for *their manufactures*. The terms of such commerce cannot fail to be liberal: there will be a fellow feeling between the parties; there will be every motive for friendship and reciprocally advantageous intercourse. — And, what are we doing with regard to the Caraccas? We are sending out Commissioners to the people there. And to do what? To mediate between them and the government of Old Spain, which government they no longer acknowledge! They have not only declared for independence; but, they have fought for it; have won it; have formed a constitution of government for themselves; and have appointed one envoy at least to treat with a foreign power. And do we expect, that, after this, they will enter into any negotiation, or conference, as *subjects of Old Spain*, that being the only capacity in which our Commissioners will be authorised to consider them? If we do, we expect a great deal more than is authorised either by the nature of the case or the character of the parties principally concerned. — Yet, while we are allied with the Old Government of Spain, we cannot enter into any compact

with the Republicans in South America: we cannot consider them as independent; but must, as far as we are able, take the opposite side; and, if, at last, Napoleon should subdue Old Spain, we shall have friends in neither country.—Besides, what an *example!* would the Anti-Jacobins exclaim. What an *example*, in taking part with, or giving countenance to Republicanism; and that, too, after having fought so many years against its principles in France! Yet, there is some reason to expect, that we must condescend, at last, to treat with these people as an independent nation; or, we must expect to have them for enemies in a neighbourhood where enterprising enemies may be very dangerous.—But let us watch *events*: for they are the only instructors that we now listen to.

NOTTINGHAM RIOTS.—These riots do not seem to be put an end to. The rioters have burnt some corn stacks, it seems, and committed various other enormities, not only in the county where their operations began, but also in Derbyshire and Leicestershire. Great numbers of troops, horse and foot, are stated to have been marched against them; but, hitherto, without much success. The cause of these riots is unquestionably a scarcity of work in the manufactures co-operating with the high price of bread. The former might in some measure be removed, the latter cannot by any power that man possesses. Whether it would be *right* to remove the former, by such steps as would re-open the ports of America to our goods, is a question upon which we differ; but, no one can doubt, that Napoleon has his eye upon these riots, and upon this marching of troops against them; and as little is it to be doubted, that he will not be thereby discouraged from adhering to his measures for shutting out English goods from the continent of Europe. Satisfied as I am, that such exclusion will, in the end, be a benefit to the people of England, I am by no means disposed to repine at his smuggling laws. W^M. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,

20th December, 1811.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

SIR; I have read, in your Weekly Register of the 7th December 1811, a letter upon the subject of Prisoners of War, which has interested the friends of huma-

nity, and particularly those who have some relations prisoners in France. I must confess, that I was induced, like many other people, to think that we had offered very advantageous proposals to the French concerning the exchange, and that on the contrary, their's were neither founded upon reason nor justice; and I pitied the long captivity of our unfortunate countrymen without the prospect of an exchange. But Candidus's letter has awoken my attention, and in making use of the small portion of understanding that nature has given me, I see plainly; by an impartial examination, that the proposals of the French are not so much to be despised, nor so much to the disadvantage of this country, as they have been represented; and it gave me some hope that the long sufferings of our prisoners may soon come to an end. According to Candidus's statement, I found that the principal, or rather the only, objection made against the plan of evacuation proposed by the French, consisted in this; that some of our countrymen, according to their plan, would remain two months longer in France than according to our own. It is now easy to prove that the portion of time for this purpose would be the same in both cases. To elucidate this matter, we must remember, that when Mr. M'Kenzie was at Morlaix, the English prisoners in France, were estimated as one to three, with respect to the number of French prisoners in England, and it was for that very reason that the French proposed to exchange the prisoners by 3,000 at a time (*viz.* one thousand English and two thousand Spaniards or Portuguese), in order that the English in France, and the French in England, might constantly remain, during the exchange, in the same proportion. Now, if we suppose the sea ports agreed upon by each government for the evacuation of the Prisoners to be at Plymouth and Morlaix;—In order to carry home our own 16,000 Prisoners, by one thousand at once, it would require the ships fitted out for that purpose to make 16 voyages from Morlaix to Plymouth. If therefore the ships, instead of bringing over only one thousand at once, were to bring over three thousand each turn, the whole 16 thousand English and 32 thousand allies would be all brought over in the time assigned for bringing over the 16 thousand English only. This statement is accurate, and presents itself to our conviction at once. Some people, I know,

have objected to the Spanish and Portuguese Prisoners coming to this country (according to the plan of the French;) but I consider their coming hither of a much greater advantage, in a military point of view, than if they were sent to Cadiz (by one thousand at a time) where they would be of very little use, and of no influence in the operation of the War; whereas, if we had them here all together, we could carry them to whatever point of the Peninsula we might choose, either to strike some great blow, or to make a very powerful diversion. As to the expence which has been mentioned for clothing and arming them, I dare say that two months pay of the French Prisoners in England would be more than sufficient for that purpose. Besides, if those Prisoners were sent from France to Spain as we propose, would there not then be the same attendant expence! Do not our Papers often inform us of clothes and arms being sent for our Spanish allies? and would there be any difference of expenditure, whether we should send these articles packed up, or on the back of the Soldiers? But even if we were to equip them, to the Peninsula, in the most expensive manner, it would only be, to spend a pound to save much more than ten thousand: would to Heaven, then, that we were never to make a worse speculation than this!—I can remember but one thing more, which has been advanced against the plan of evacuation as proposed by the French, which, so far from being an objection, is, as I should think, a high recommendation to it; and that is, that our allies would be exchanged at the same time with our own Prisoners. For my part, I cannot conceive that our Prisoners would object to this plan, nor can I see in what manner it would be an injury or an injustice towards our soldiers to exchange them with those who have fought by their side, and been taken along with them. Were it not for such erroneous ideas, our countrymen would now have been returned to their homes a year ago. How many years they are still to remain captives, and what good reason may be given for their captivity, we must ask of those who lay all the blame upon the French government.—As to our plan of evacuation, Candidus has given us very clear reasons, why the French government must object to it. The French have as

great right to mistrust us, as we to mistrust them; and can any one blame them? nay, have not the transactions for these last ten years proved that we are by no means so pure a people as to refuse to adopt a measure very advantageous, only because it is unjust: Might not the French have just ground to expect that after the evacuation of Spain and Portugal by the British army, we should say to them; now that the Spaniards and Portuguese are become French subjects, we cannot reasonably exchange them against Frenchmen: When, therefore, and against whom (the French would say) would have been exchanged the 30,000 French Prisoners remaining in this country?—We see then, Sir, that by consenting to the French plan of evacuation, our countrymen would be exchanged in the same length of time, as by our own; that we should save more than one million sterling a year (necessary for the maintenance of the French Prisoners in this country) and moreover should have 50,000 English and Spaniards to dispose of. These are advantages resulting from an exchange of Prisoners to the country at large; and what a blessing would it be,—for our brave and unfortunate countrymen, who without it may perhaps never see their country again;—for their friends in England, who long to see them;—for the wives and children who have been deprived of their husbands and fathers for so many years? (I mean the wives and children of the English travellers detained in France ever since the year 1803). It belongs only, Sir, to a pen like yours, to treat such an interesting subject as it ought to be. When the good of the country is in contemplation, it is enough to give a hint to a man like Mr. Cobbett: we see him always in search of subjects which tend to the good and happiness of his countrymen; he will certainly undertake to plead so just a cause as this (upon which our venal writers will keep silent because they have nothing to say against it), and I hope, that, through him, the truths contained in this letter, will find their way to the Public, and perhaps reach our gracious and benevolent Prince (the only hope of England) who will not think, I am sure, this subject unworthy of his high consideration.—I have the honour to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, MILES.

December 13, 1811.